The Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising Among Empires by Hulsebosch, Daniel J.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 53 
Number 1 The Use and Misuse of History in 
U.S. Foreign Relations Law (Fall 2008) 
Article 14 
2008 
The Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising Among 
Empires 
Daniel J. Hulsebosch 
New York University School of Law, daniel.hulsebosch@nyu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising Among Empires, 53 St. 
Louis U. L.J. (2008). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol53/iss1/14 
This Response is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
209 
THE FOUNDERS’ FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION: 
IMPROVISING AMONG EMPIRES 
DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH* 
David Sloss’s paper recovers an important episode in early American 
history—the neutrality controversy—and suggests some of its implications for 
the constitutional law of federal court jurisdiction.1  It is a fascinating analysis 
from which lawyers and historians can learn much.  My only major comment 
is that Sloss could consider viewing the controversy as, foremost, a diplomatic 
crisis for a newly postcolonial nation rather than a domestic problem of 
constitutional interpretation.  He could then consider how the United States’ 
precarious international situation influenced the way that the founding 
generation constructed their new Constitution.  The special features of their 
domestic constitutionalism, in turn, allowed the founders-turned-administrators 
to innovate upon the doctrine of neutrality under the law of nations.  The 
neutrality controversy, therefore, left its marks on both international and 
domestic law. 
Sloss views the neutrality controversy through the lens of the separation of 
powers and tries to find an original pattern for determining which branch has 
the preeminent power to interpret international law, especially treaties.2  
Important ideas about the relationship between the Executive and Judicial 
Branches when interpreting the law of nations did emerge at that time, but this 
intramural problem was not atop the agenda in the 1790s.  Instead the goal, as 
Sloss recognizes, was to keep the United States out of the imperial war that 
surrounded it.3  That can be put stronger: the agenda was to keep the project of 
American independence afloat.  For a generation after the Revolution, the 
United States remained a provisional and peripheral actor in the Atlantic 
world.  In that world, Western Europe was center stage.  The European 
empires were also important audiences for the American experiment and were 
curious about whether it would work.  Consequently, many in the founding 
 
* Professor of Law & History, NYU School of Law.  Comment on David Sloss, Judicial Foreign 
Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145 (2008). 
 1. See David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
145, 146–47 (2008). 
 2. See id. at 148–51, 153 
 3. Id. at 147–48. 
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generation knew that they had to keep earning independence by navigating 
through hazards like the neutrality controversy.  Sloss rightly argues that the 
neutrality crisis affected constitutional interpretation, and the episode supports 
his argument that “the exclusive political control thesis is inconsistent with the 
Founders’ understanding of the constitutional separation of powers in foreign 
affairs.”4  The controversy demonstrates the interrelation of the three branches 
of the federal government, as all three participated in formulating the U.S. 
response.5  Together, they also contributed to the development of the 
international law of neutral rights. 
Diplomatic historians view the neutrality controversy as testing the 
delicate, triangulated relationship between the fledgling United States and the 
large British and French Empires surrounding it in on land and sea.6  Political 
historians also find the episode fascinating because it began to expose 
ideological differences within the Washington Administration.7  On the one 
hand were those, like Thomas Jefferson, who sympathized with the French 
Revolution and, at least in part, with Citizen Genet’s claim that the United 
States and France were leading a republican reformation of government that 
would remake the globe.8  On the other hand were those, like Alexander 
Hamilton, who believed that the American future lay in a rapprochement with 
the British Empire.9  It was master of the Atlantic (one reason why the French 
had to resort to American ports) and held the keys to familiar trade routes.10  
Beyond this lay the emotional attachment of many in the founding generation 
to the British Empire, especially those who had lived outside the thirteen 
colonies before the Revolution.  Hamilton, for example, had been born in the 
West Indies,11 and South Carolina’s Judge Thomas Bee was an Oxford 
graduate who spent time in the Inns of Court.12  To them, Citizen Genet’s 
mission looked like an assault on American independence and risked igniting a 
war with Britain that, this time, the Americans might not be able to win.13  This 
 
 4. Id. at 194. 
 5. Id. at 194–95. 
 6. See, e.g., CHARLES M. THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN 
CABINET GOVERNMENT 17 (AMS Press, Inc. 1967) (1931). 
 7. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 336 (1993). 
 8. THOMAS, supra note 6, at 14–16. 
 9. Id. at 20. 
 10. Sloss, supra note 1, at 152. 
 11. See FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 7 (1979). 
 12. See GEORGE C. ROGERS, EVOLUTION OF A FEDERALIST 181 (1962); Thomas M. Stubbs, 
South Carolina’s Federal Justices and Judges, 8 S.C. L. Q. 403, 407 (1956). 
 13. THOMAS, supra note 6, at 17. 
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threat helped dampen political differences and generated a consensus within 
the Administration that it should avoid war—especially with Britain.14 
Sloss shows that the neutrality controversy had legal repercussions beyond 
these familiar narratives.15  Perhaps the biggest news for those interested in 
federal court history is the overwhelming dominance of the federal docket by 
admiralty cases.16  The manuscript bench notes and reports recently published 
in the Documentary History of the Supreme Court make this dominance more 
apparent.17  Sloss uses this wonderful resource to great effect.18  The first 
federal courts were essentially admiralty courts.  It is often forgotten that the 
Continental Congress did have a Confederation-wide court between 1778 and 
1789: the Court of Appeals, which heard admiralty appeals from state trial 
courts.19  Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789 built upon this precedent 
and gave the federal trial courts exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty cases.20 
Consequently, the early federal courts spent much of their time interpreting 
a central branch of the law of nations and exploring its intersection with federal 
law and the Constitution.  The federal judiciary was from the outset—or at 
least at the outset—a necessarily cosmopolitan tribunal and cited treaties, law 
of nations treatises, and admiralty decisions from Europe. Federal judges were 
fully enmeshed in the Atlantic world, though their orientation was certainly not 
global.21  Unlike the old Court of Appeals and most European admiralty courts 
at the time, however, the federal courts had other jurisdictional grants, too.22  
This close connection between admiralty and other dimensions of federal court 
jurisdiction helped blur the distinction within the federal courts between 
ordinary civil and prize jurisdictions, which in turn facilitated the novel 
extension or at least judicialization of neutral rights during the controversy.23 
 
 14. Id. at 21; see also WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE AGE OF SAIL 109 (2006); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American 
Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819 (1989). 
 15. See Sloss, supra note 1, at 164–67. 
 16. See HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE 
PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1775–1787 (unpaginated preface by author) 
(1977); Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An 
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 865, 877–78 (2005). 
 17. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800, 8 vols. (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985–2007). 
 18. See Sloss, supra note 1. 
 19. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at preface. 
 20. Id. at 339–40. 
 21. The Founders’ intellectual world, at least, was not that large.  Query, though, whether 
modern American international law scholars typically range wider for sources than judges did in 
the early republic. 
 22. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 332. 
 23. See generally SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1990) (describing the judicialization of rights in the early republic); DANIEL J. 
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This history of judicial cosmopolitanism informs Sloss’s positive 
conclusions, which he suggests ought to have normative consequences in the 
twenty-first century.24  First, in contrast to the claims made today, the founding 
federal judges were not judicial minimalists.  Second, the judiciary had a 
prominent role in interpreting and applying the law of nations under the federal 
Constitution.  Both points are sound.  The first point, however, raises the 
normative question of how much argumentative weight this tale of three years 
of judicial action in the 1790s should have today.  The second and more 
historical point raises the nature of that judicial action.  Sloss concludes that 
the Founders believed that the Judicial Branch had the primary responsibility 
for resolving foreign affairs controversies affecting private rights that require 
the application of law to fact.25  This seems like a large abstraction of this 
episode’s lesson, not least because it is difficult to delineate the outer 
boundaries of “cases involving the rights of private parties that required the 
application of law to fact.”26 
The controversy did give rise to influential thoughts about how the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction was limited to actual cases or controversies, as opposed to 
the giving of advisory opinions.  The case or controversy principle was not, 
however, consistently applied.  For example, the Supreme Court went out of its 
way in some cases to issue obiter dicta that were, in effect, advisory opinions, 
as when it stated in Glass v. The Sloop Betsey that the French had no right to 
establish consular prize courts in the United States without a treaty giving them 
such a right.27  Similarly, after initial hesitation in the district courts, the 
federal judiciary aggressively interpreted its jurisdiction to reach British 
restitution cases that were novel under the law of nations, even though the 
courts ended up dismissing most British claims for restitution on the merits.28  
In short, the early Court exercised international influence beyond actual cases 
and controversies. 
Yet the judiciary did not hold a monopoly on cases or controversies.  
Sloss’s fascinating tale demonstrates that not all cases and controversies 
involving the application of the law of nations to fact situations were resolved 
in the courts.  Instead, all three branches participated.29  Because it is difficult 
 
HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 237–58 (2005); LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 93–127 (2004). 
 24. Sloss, supra note 1, at 195–96. 
 25. Id. at 195. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794); see William R. Casto, Foreign 
Affairs Crises and the Constitution’s Case or Controversy Limitation: Notes from the Founding 
Era, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 241–43 (2004). 
 28. See Sloss, supra note 1, at 165, 170–71, 182. 
 29. See id. at 150–51, 161–71. 
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to imagine law of nations controversies that do not involve its application to 
facts, and in which there are no private rights at stake, Sloss’s formulation 
would seem to require the judicialization of most international law 
controversies. 
Instead of judicial monopoly, the first years of the federal government 
were characterized by uncertainty and experimentation.  A range of 
government actors—state as well as federal; executive, legislative, and 
judicial—struggled with the central foreign policy problem of the 1790s: how 
to avoid war with either of the two empires that dominated the Atlantic world 
around them and that were at war with each other for most of the decade.30  
Those two empires had used the United States before as a vehicle for their own 
conflict.31  The American Revolution is a good example.  The Franco-
American Treaty of 1778, a key source of law in the neutrality controversy, 
was a lifeline for the Revolutionaries.32  Without it, they might have been 
remembered in history as rebels rather than revolutionaries.  But that Treaty 
was also one of many strategic gambits played by the French against their 
long-time nemesis, Britain.  American diplomats like John Jay were aware of 
France’s mixed motivations in supporting their cause.33  Therefore, suspicion 
of European diplomacy ran through the early American republic.  Some feared 
that the surrounding empires might carve up the United States among 
themselves, a fear expressed in Federalist literature supporting the 
Constitution.34  The point of the Constitution, however, was not to isolate the 
Union but rather to enable it to deal with neighboring empires on the basis of 
equality. 
Therefore, instead of settling the distribution of powers of the foreign 
affairs Constitution, the neutrality controversy looks like an extended 
improvisation.  Federal officials used the institutional complexity of their 
Constitution to distribute and diffuse responsibility for addressing the 
international threat.  The separation of powers became a device for spreading 
authority among federal actors while seeking resolutions, or at least an ongoing 
process, that would pacify France and Britain.  The situation demanded that the 
Administration both act like a unitary sovereign state that would be respected 
 
 30. THOMAS, supra note 6, at 21. 
 31. See, e.g., JAMES B. PERKINS, FRANCE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 236 (2007) 
(noting France’s motivation to “humble a rival and avenge past defeats” in assisting the colonies 
during the American Revolution). 
 32. Frances Fitzgerald, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of 
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 896 (2001). 
 33. See SAMUEL F. BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 53–57 (5th ed. 
1965). 
 34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay); see also BEMIS, supra note 33, at 46–84; 
FELIX GILBERT, TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
(1961). 
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on the international stage and figure out how the institutional pluralism of the 
federal Constitution worked in practice.  It turned out that domestic 
constitutional pluralism could be exploited for international advantage. 
As soon as French privateers began arriving in U.S. ports, British 
representatives complained that the captures were illegal for one reason or 
another.  The claims fitted into one of two categories: some ships were 
supposedly seized in neutral American waters; others were seized on the high 
seas, but by French privateers outfitted in U.S. ports.35  The Cabinet debated 
how to respond to the British petitions and then distinguished between the two 
kinds of claims.36  It decided to let Attorney General Edmund Randolph 
resolve the issue in the case of ships allegedly captured in U.S. waters.37  This 
process was consistent with international custom: although only courts of the 
captor’s nation had the power to adjudge a vessel prize or not prize, executive 
officials of a third-party nation could investigate restitution claims and 
recommend a decision.38  When Randolph found that a British vessel had been 
in neutral waters, he advised the French that it should be returned, and they 
complied.39  However, in the related claim that the French had enlisted 
American seamen and outfitted their privateers in American ports, the Cabinet 
split, two against two, on whether it had the power to demand reparations from 
France.40  Alexander Hamilton argued that the Executive should decide these 
cases also, adding that the courts were not “competent” to hear such cases.41  
Apparently, the Cabinet then did nothing in those cases.  The British then fired 
off many similar petitions, which set off a return volley from the French side 
reminding the Administration of the provision in the 1778 Treaty of Amity, 
requiring admittance of French prize.42  But the French had not yet adjudged 
the captures to be prize.43  Blocked from many of their Caribbean ports, French 
captors brought the captured ships to the United States either to try to condemn 
them in their own new consular prize courts or to warehouse them for an 
 
 35. Sloss, supra note 1, at 171. 
 36. See id. at 160–62. 
 37. See id. at 161–62. 
 38. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 3–36. 
 39. Edmund Randolph’s Opinion on the Grange (May 14, 1973), in 26 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 31–35 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995). 
 40. See Editor’s Introductory Note to Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George 
Washington (May 15, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 454 (Harold C. 
Syrett ed., 1969) (noting that the Cabinet split 2-2 on the issue of recommending restitution in the 
illegal outfitting cases). 
 41. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (May 15, 1793), in 14 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 40, at 459. 
 42. See Sloss, supra note 1, at 162–63, 173–76. 
 43. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 7, at 343. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] THE FOUNDERS’ FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION 215 
extended period.44  Neither was probably contemplated under the 1778 treaty 
provision. 
Faced with numerous petitions, the Cabinet asked the state governors and 
federal attorneys general in June 1793 to press these claims in federal court.45  
If the courts denied the federal attorneys’ requests, then the governors were to 
hold vessels in question “until the further orders of the General government 
[could] be had.”46  It is difficult to say with certainty, at least without 
considerable research, why the Administration chose to renounce diplomatic 
resolution in favor of judicial process.  In part, it was not the Administration’s 
decision: British ship owners and diplomatic officials initiated the court cases 
after the Administration failed to act on their restitution petitions to recover 
losses inflicted by privateers outfitted in American ports.47  This effort began 
as a British gambit that, as Professor Sloss observes, looked something like 
today’s “lawfare,”48 except that the British were using a third party’s courts 
rather than their opponent’s courts to influence the course of their war.  It was 
also a punt that extricated the Cabinet from a difficult situation in which it 
would have had to make a series of decisions against the interests of either 
France or Britain.  In addition, turning the business over to the courts was 
administratively convenient.  On his own, the Attorney General lacked a full 
department or bureaucracy to help him make the decisions.49  At least the 
judges had a court system: marshals and district attorneys, and the assistance of 
customs collectors.50  Finally, a judicial resolution furthered the argument that 
the United States was a lawful nation that operated as a government of laws 
and not men.  That helps explain Thomas Jefferson’s draft letter in June 1793 
to Genet stating that the judiciary alone was “competent” to decide questions 
of property between individuals.51  If Britain was leveraging its claims on the 
American extension of their shared principle of judicial independence, 
Americans welcomed the gambit.  For the Washington Administration, it was 
useful to begin to see individual cases as committed to another branch once 
that branch accepted jurisdiction over them, even though it was clear that the 
 
 44. See Sloss, supra note 1, at 152-53. 
 45. Cabinet Opinions on the Republican and the Catharine (June 12, 1973), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 259–60. 
 46. Id. at 260. 
 47. See Sloss, supra note 1, at 162–63. 
 48. Id. at 173–74. 
 49. See List of Civil Officers of the United States, Except Judges, with Their Emoluments, 
for the Year Ending Oct. 1, 1792 (Feb. 27, 1973), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MISCELLANEOUS 57, 59 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 
1834), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html. 
 50. See id. at 59–61. 
 51. Draft Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 301. 
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Executive Branch could also decide such cases—and had.  Later, Congress 
also got involved in defining and preserving U.S. neutrality, in part by placing 
federal court jurisdiction on a firm statutory basis.52 
At the outset, however, most federal district judges demurred.  In Glass v. 
The Sloop Betsey, for example, District Court Judge Richard Peters held that 
he had no jurisdiction because of the venerable law of nations rule that the 
question of prize or no prize was reserved to the courts of the captor’s nation.53  
But he also expected that the Supreme Court would review his decision.54  The 
Court—led by Chief Justice John Jay, who had as much diplomatic experience 
as any American—decided that the federal courts had jurisdiction to review 
whether a particular capture violated neutral rights or did not, while implicitly 
claiming that this power did not violate the venerable rule that only courts of 
the captor’s nation had jurisdiction to decide prize or no prize.55 
Professor Sloss is correct to highlight the turn to the courts and the 
Supreme Court’s embrace of jurisdiction.56  Neither was predictable.  In fact, 
both were unorthodox under the law of nations.  The standard procedure was 
for a complaining nation to work through diplomatic channels.  Again, third-
nation courts were not supposed to interfere in the prize/no prize decision-
making process.57  Sloss then concludes that the Cabinet realized that the issue, 
which involved the application of international law to specific facts, was 
essentially judicial and confined to the courts.58 
Something more specific was going on than a general commitment to 
leaving factual determinations under the law of nations to the judiciary.  
Administration officials were trying to add flesh to the principle of neutrality.  
To do that, they gradually framed both types of neutrality cases—those 
involving French prizes brought to U.S. ports without condemnation or for 
condemnation in consular courts and those arising from the activities of 
privateers that the French fitted out in the United States—as raising a single 
issue: the violation of American neutrality.  That neutrality entailed both duties 
and rights.  The United States had the duty to avoid favoring one side or 
another in a war between nations; it also had the right to preserve its internal 
integrity and penalize those who tried to drag it into war unwillingly.  This was 
the key conceptual innovation behind the federal cases and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sloop Betsey.59  Neutral nations did not just have rights.  
 
 52. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat 381. 
 53. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 9 (1794); see also Sloss, supra note 1, at 
166, 169 & n.129. 
 54. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 16. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Sloss, supra note 1, at 170–71, 172–83. 
 57. Id. at 169. 
 58. Id. at 162–64. 
 59. See id. at 194–95. 
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They also had a duty not to favor one side in a war more than the other, a duty 
that required a concrete remedial scheme.  The involvement of the judiciary 
also furthered the argument that the United States was a nation-state of laws 
rather than men, and that in the United States, the law of nations was taken 
seriously as a special kind of law that could not be reduced to negotiated 
politics.  Seen in this light, the Court’s goal seems to have been to vindicate 
neutrality with creative remedies rather than to interfere with the established 
practices of international prize law.  Judicialization of the international 
grievance procedure helped diffuse responsibility within the United States and 
defuse an international crisis. 
In sum, Professor Sloss’s paper lets us see how the Executive actually 
operated and how it sought and welcomed the participation of the other 
branches.  There was no unitary foreign affairs power.60  The foreign affairs 
Constitution, like the rest of the Constitution, was shot through with concurrent 
powers.  The Washington Administration made use of this concurrency.  It 
reached out to other branches to coordinate policy, generate efficient decision 
making, and also diffuse responsibility.  The diffusion, in turn, was presented 
to foreign nations as evidence of the United States’ lawful behavior and fitness 
for participation in the community of nations.  This has proved to be one of the 
main functions of modern constitutions, which do not simply structure 
governments for internal purposes, but also integrate new states into the larger 
world.  A constitution represents a claim by new states to negotiate on the 
world stage on an equal footing, to get respect, and to earn recognition.61  In 
the 1790s, the United States was still a precarious experiment that had perhaps 
defeasible acceptance from the empires of the Atlantic world.  Americans kept 
performing their independence in a context that demanded that they harness a 
variety of domestic institutions for the resolution of international claims. 
In a world in which international recognition was a process rather than a 
moment, David Sloss has illuminated how American officials—the President, 
Cabinet, federal judges, federal attorneys, customs collectors, state governors, 
and state militias and marshals—participated in a multi-act drama of American 
independence that lasted a generation.  The neutrality controversy sheds light 
on formative moves that helped construct the meaning of the Constitution.  The 
immediate goal was recognition and peace—true independence—rather than to 
delineate separate zones of constitutional authority among the three branches.  
The founding generation realized that in a dangerous world, it was best as a 
 
 60. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004). 
 61. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, On an Equal Footing: Constitution-
Making and the Law of Nations in the Early American Republic (Jan. 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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matter of foreign and domestic policy to get all branches involved in making 
decisions that had international repercussions.  It is a lesson worth re-learning. 
 
